Explaining the end of Spanish exceptionalism and electoral support for Vox by Turnbull-Dugarte, Stuart J.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
DOI:
10.1177/2053168019851680
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Turnbull-Dugarte, S. J. (2019). Explaining the end of Spanish exceptionalism and electoral support for Vox.
Research and Politics, 6(2), 1-8. https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168019851680
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 26. Sep. 2019
 1 
Explaining the end of Spanish exceptionalism and electoral support for Vox.  
-Accepted manuscript version-  
 
Stuart J. Turnbull-Dugarte 
 
 
The 2018 regional elections in Andalucía marked the end of Spain’s exceptional status as a 
country with a party system free from the radical right.  The electoral success of the radical 
right-wing challenger, Vox, who gained eleven percent of the vote and twelve seats in the 
regional parliament, brought this exceptionalism to an end. This paper analyses the 
individual-level determinants that explain the electoral success of Vox and the emergence of 
the radical right within the Spanish party system. The results indicate that concerns over 
devolution, likely engendered by the Catalan separatist crisis, predominantly explain voters’ 
preferences for the right-wing challenger. This is true both amongst the general electorate as 
well as amongst the former voters of other right-wing parties. Significantly, against popular 
assumptions and empirical observations explaining the rise of radical right-wing parties 
across much of Western Europe, the results display no empirical link between immigration 
and electoral support for Vox. 
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Introduction 
The 2018 regional elections in the autonomous community of Andalucía in Spain signalled a 
substantial shake up of the country’s party system, bringing about the end of Spain’s 
exceptional status
i
 as a country without a radical right-wing political party (Alonso & 
Kaltwasser, 2015). The new right-wing challenger, Vox, gained electoral success for the first 
time, winning eleven percent of the votes cast and gaining a total of twelve seats in the 
regional parliament. The party’s support was also essential in ousting the socialist-led 
regional government which had been in power in Andalucía for more than thirty-six years, 
supporting the right-wing coalition between the Partido Popular (PP) and Ciudadanos.  
 
In this paper, I provide the first empirical assessment of the individual-level factors that 
explain the motivations behind electoral support for Vox. Relying on post-electoral survey 
data
ii
 from 1,413 voters collected shortly after the election took place, it is argued that the 
political conflict regarding the separatist movement in Catalonia and the inability of national 
government to resolve the same had a large impact on explaining individual support for Vox. 
 
Empirically, I demonstrate that those voters who express support for reducing the political 
independence of the country’s autonomous communities are more likely to vote for Vox. In 
significant contrast to the understanding of the radical right-wing vote across other Western 
European countries that view right-wing support to be driven by concerns over immigration, 
distrust with the political establishment, and voters from the lower end of the socio-economic  
distribution (Ford & Goodwin, 2014; Mudde, 2007; Norris, 2005; Oesch, 2013; Rydgren, 
2008; Zhirkov, 2014), I find that concerns over radical right-wing issues such as immigration 
are not found to exhibit an influential role in predicting electoral support for the new right-
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wing challenger in Spain. Moreover, income status and political distrust play no role in 
explaining Vox’s electoral success.  
 
Election context 
The December 2
nd
 elections in Andalucía took place three months ahead of schedule after the 
regional president, Susanna Díaz, called early elections in the October. The announcement 
came only a few months after the successful no-confidence motion brought forward by the 
Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party (PSOE) replaced the PP’s Mariano Rajoy with their own 
leader, Pedro Sánchez, as president of Spain. Díaz’ call for early elections was widely viewed 
as a political gamble that the regional president thought would be advantageous given that 
she would be able to monopolise on the PSOE’s political momentum after taking over the 
national executive (Martín-Arroyo, 2018).  
 
The elections took place, however, during a time of heightened territorial tensions.  
Alongside the traditional partisan conflict across liberal-left and conservative-right regarding 
economic and social issues, Spanish political competition is also marked by a second 
dimension involving centre-periphery conflict over devolution (Alonso et al., 2015; Pardos-
Prado and Sagarzazu, 2019; Sánchez-Cuenca and Dinas, 2012), specifically regarding the 
political competences of Spain’s autonomous regions. On October 1st 2017, the Catalan 
government, led by a coalition of separatist parties, held an unauthorised
iii
 referendum and 
unilaterally declared independence from Spain shortly afterwards on October 27
th
. The 
national government, led at the time by Rajoy, acted to suppress the separatist movement and 
invoked Article 155 of the Spanish Constitution which led to the cessation of the Catalan 
government and other regional authorities, and the temporary direct rule over the region from 
Madrid until new elections were called. Little improvement has been made to the political 
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conflict since then (Orriols, 2018), with the former leader of the Catalan government, Carles 
Puigdemont, currently in self-imposed exile in Brussels whilst a cohort of his former 
government colleagues undergo trial for charges of rebellion against the state in the country’s 
supreme court. Currently, a separatist coalition remains in power in Catalonia whilst political 
conflict over Catalan separatism has noted an expansion beyond the confines of the region’s 
own electorate into the national arena (Kingsley and Minder, 2017; Sánchez-Cuenca, 2018). 
 
In addition to the national domestic conflict caused by the Catalan question, the elections in 
Andalucía took place at the end of a year when Spain had become the new focal point of the 
European migrant crisis with the number of migrants arriving to Spain from Africa in 2018 
surpassing those that landed in both Italy and Greece (Keeley, 2018). The decision of the 
Sánchez-led socialist government to adopt a stance solidarity with incoming migrants and to 
accept the disembarking of migrants rescued on the Aquarius ship after the Italian 
government refused to receive them was also not without criticism from the press and 
opposition parties (Sanmartín, 2018).  
 
The political success of Vox has largely been claimed by political commentators to be the 
result of the party’s ability to mobilise voters on both the Catalan and immigration themes 
(Jabois, 2018; Llaneras, Galán. and Andrino, 2018). I argue that whilst there is empirical 
support for the former, the claim for the latter is not supported by the individual-level data.  
 
Vox 
The popularity of Vox and the electoral potential of the party was first made apparent after it 
gathered a crowd in surplus of nine thousand people to an arena in Madrid (Lambertucci, 
2018) in October 2018. Like the other recent partisan entrepreneurs in Spain (Anduiza et al., 
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2014; Turnbull-Dugarte, 2019), Vox had been able to garner much of its initial support 
through a grassroots-based communication strategy carried out over social media (Viejo and 
Alonso, 2018) where the party has been able to expand its support base without relying on the 
traditional mainstream media outlets.  
 
Vox is a party with a political ideology firmly grounded in authoritarian conservativism and 
nationalism. Far from being a single-issue anti-immigrant party (Art, 2011), it advocates 
policy positions including opposition to same-sex marriage, abortion, gender quotas, gender 
violence protection ordinances and general social welfare provision; marking the party’s 
ideological parity with other Western European radical right-wing parties (Art, 2011; Mudde, 
2004, 2007; Norris, 2005). Indeed, it’s populist approach of promising to “make Spain great 
again” alongside its nativist authoritarianism signal its fulfilment of Mudde’s (2004) 
classification as populist radical right party. Of note in the specific case of Vox, however, is 
the addition of a strong anti-feminist message (Simón, 2019) brought about in response to 
recent waves of feminist advancement in Spain as evidence by the historical 8M 
demonstrations in 2018. 
 
Echoing parties of a similar ideological and populist flare such as France’s Front National, 
Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland, Britain’s UKIP and others across Europe (Art, 2011; 
Zhirkov, 2014) the party adopts a very hard line on immigration, advocating for the 
deportation of all undocumented immigrants, the deportation of those who commit any crime, 
and an end to social policies that serve to attract immigrants (Vox, 2018). The hard-line 
stance on immigration breaks away from the rest of the parties operating within Spain
iv
 
(Morales, Pardos-Prado and Ros, 2015) and the lack of political saliency traditionally given 
to the issue in public discourse and amongst voters (Encarnación, 2004).  
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On the Catalan question, Vox promotes policies that reflect both its preference for 
authoritarianism and focus on Spanish nationalism. In response to the separatist threat, the 
party calls for both the suspension of the autonomous independence of the Catalan region - 
policy proposal number one in its programme of one hundred measures (Vox, 2018) - as well 
as the constitutional prohibition of any party that seeks separatist objectives
v
. These 
objectives, particularly the latter, mark Vox’s extremism and spatially political 
distinctiveness vis-à-vis the other right-wing parties. 
 
Election result 
The election resulted in the worst electoral outcome observed by the PSOE in the region with 
the party losing fourteen seats and any path to the region’s executive. The regional variant of 
Podemos, Adelante Andalucía (AA), also saw a reduction in its electoral fortunes losing 
almost six percent of its vote share. Across the leftist bloc, PSOE and AA lost a total of 
seventeen seats to the right. The mainstream right-wing parties of PP and Ciudadanos 
claimed victory arguing that the people of Andalucía had voted for change and political 
renewal despite the PP actually worsening its position vis-à-vis the previous regional 
elections in terms of both vote share and seats (Table 1). 
 
Despite the mainstream right’s claims of victory, the national press focused on the main news 
story of the night which was that of the political eruption of Vox into the electoral arena, with 
political pundits making clear that some form of political agreement with the radical right 
party was very likely given the legislative arithmetic of the results. In the end, a new PP-
Ciudadanos coalition government was installed with support of Vox bringing to a close 
thirty-six years of PSOE-led governments in the region. 
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Table 1: Regional elections results in Andalucía from 2015 and 2018 
% Vote share (seats) 
 2015 2018 Difference 
PSOE 35.43 (47) 27.95 (33) -7.48 (-14) 
PP 26.76 (33) 20.75 (26) -6.01 (-7) 
Cs 9.28 (9) 18.27 (21) +8.99 (12) 
AA* 21.73 (20) 16.18 (17) -5.55 (-3) 
Vox 0.45 (0) 10.97 (12) +10.52 (12) 
*In 2015 = shared vote share and seat count of Podemos and Izquierda Unida Los Verdes-
Convocatoria por Andulucía before uniting under the Adelante Andalucía (AA) regional brand. 
 
 
Not altogether surprisingly, the vast majority of Vox’ supporters came from parties already 
ideologically placed within the right (Figure 1). Almost half of the voters came from the PP 
whilst one fifth came from Ciudadanos (Cs). Votes from parties on the left represented a far 
smaller proportion of their electoral revenue providing together less than ten percent of Vox’s 
votes in 2018.  
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Figure 1: Partisan vote revenue of Vox support.  
Source: Own elaboration from post-electoral survey data (CIS #3236). 
 
In the following section, I examine the individual factors that are associated with electoral 
support for Vox. Given the strong link between support for radical right parties and 
immigration observed across much of Western Europe (Ford & Goodwin, 2014; Mudde, 
2007; Norris, 2005; Rydgren, 2008; Zhirkov, 2014) alongside the party’s own hostilely 
critical position towards the issue, the link between immigration and support for Vox 
represents a rational assumption. The results of the following, however, demonstrate that 
Spain remains different: I find a robust non-effect between concerns over immigration and 
individual support for Vox. Given the saliency of the Catalan question, I hypothesise that 
support for Vox will be a function of voters’ views on the political powers of the autonomous 
communities given the strong message of Vox against regionalism and aggressive pro-
nationalist messaging. Support for this hypothesis is borne out in the data. 
 
 
48.4 
21.2 
2.5 
5.8 
3.3 
9.8 
1.6 
7.5 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
PP Cs Vox PSOE Unidos
Podemos
Abstentions Other DK
Source of 2018 Vox vote (%) from 2016 General Election  
 9 
Testing Vote choice  
Dependent variable and estimation technique 
In order to assess the individual-level determinants of vote choice for Vox, I rely on the post-
electoral survey data completed by the CIS between the 10
th
 of December 2018 and the 3
rd
 of 
January 2019. The dependent variable relies on self-reported vote choice for each of the five 
main parties (PSOE, PP, Ciudadanos, AA, and Vox) in the 2018 election. Given the nominal 
nature of the dependent variable, I estimate a multinomial logistic regression model (baseline: 
abstention
vi
).  
 
Independent variables 
To test the individual explements of electoral support for Vox, I focus on assessing 
opposition to territorial devolution – measured in support for the independence of the 
autonomous communities – and concerns over immigration. The dichotomous independent 
variable reduce autonomy is included in the model and reports voters who think that the 
independence of autonomous regions should be reduced (1) or remain the same (0). To assess 
the impact of concerns regarding immigration I rely on respondents’ answers to the most 
important problem (MIP) question. Survey respondents are asked, “Amongst the themes that 
appear on this card, which do you think are the most important for the new Government of 
Andalucía?”, and identify two issues that they think are the most pressing for the regional 
government. I operationalise concern over immigration by identifying those respondents who 
reported immigration to be one of the two MIPs (1) and those that did not (0).  
 
Controls 
The model conditions for a vector of politically relevant variables as well as socio-economic 
indicators. At the political level, the model includes five controls: support for the incumbent  
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(0-10) at the regional and national level; ideological placement across the left (0) vs. right 
(10) axis; distrust towards politics (1= respondent’s impression of politics is of distrust, 
0=otherwise); and former political activity (1= respondent had previously attended a political 
protest, 0=otherwise).  
 
The model also caters for two demographic indicators: gender (1=male) and age. At the 
socio-economic level, the model includes four controls: religiosity (min: never attends 
church, max:  frequently (at least once per week) attends church); education (min: primary 
education, max: tertiary education); income; and employment. Income is operationalised on 
an eleven-point ordinal scale
vii
 and employment status is a categorical variable (baseline: 
working) indicating those who are unemployed, retired, studying, or not in the labour force
viii
 
(NILF).  
 
Analysis 
For ease of interpretation, the average marginal effects (AME) of the main explanatory 
variables are visualised in Figure 2 (detailed regression and AME output in appendix). The 
analysis provides a number of significant findings. Firstly, concerns over immigration do not 
exhibit any independent effect on the probability of voting for Vox, or any other party, at 
levels of traditional statistical significance. Against popular assumptions and empirical 
evidence to support this expectation, immigration concerns are not operating in Spain as an 
influential factor for individuals’ voting behaviour or specifically in support of Vox. 
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Figure 2: Average marginal effects (AME) of main explanatory variables 
 
As a robustness check
ix
, I test that the non-significance of the immigration variable is not 
conditional on socio-economic status. Since concerns over immigration have been found in 
some cases to be driven by economic anxieties amongst the working class and other 
“economic losers” (Ford and Goodwin, 2014; Kriesi et al., 2008; Mudde, 2007; Oesch, 
2013), if this is at work in the Spanish case one might expect there to be a significant 
relationship between immigration and support for Vox amongst those at the lower end of the 
income distribution. This does not appear to be the case: re-estimating the main model to 
include an interaction term between immigration and income reveals that immigration 
exhibits no effect on the probability of voting for Vox regardless of individuals’ income. 
Figure 3 illustrates the effect of the interaction which highlights the consistency of the non-
effect of immigration. Notably, the effect is absent at income values where the majority of the 
population belong (see mean and standard deviation values in Figure 3).  
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Moreover, whilst the effect does not provide results of significance (p<0.05), the visualisation 
presented in Figure 3 appears to suggest that support for Vox increases with income. This 
shows that support for the radical right party in Spain is not driven by low-income status or 
economic “loser” status which contrasts greatly with the right-wing voters observed 
elsewhere on the continent (Kriesi et al., 2008; Norris, 2005; Oesch, 2013).  
 
 
Figure 3: Robustness check on (un)conditionality of immigration 
 
Greater clarity is provided by views on Spanish devolution. Those who believe that the 
independence of the autonomous regions should be reduced observe a five percentage-point 
increase in the probability of voting for Vox. The effect is both substantive and significant. 
For both the PP and Ciudadanos, individuals’ desire to castrate autonomous independence 
does not appear to have provided them with any electoral support: the null-effect lies well 
within the confidence intervals of the variable for both parties.  
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Blame game 
Significant variation is observed in the effect of support for the political incumbents at 
different levels of the political system (Figure 4). Whilst positive evaluations for both the 
regional (Díaz) and national (Sánchez) president increased votes for the PSOE, individual 
assessments of the Díaz did not impact electoral support for Vox. In other words, Vox votes 
were not driven by discontent with the leader operating at the subnational level, but of 
negative assessments of the president at the national level. Since the Catalan question is the 
contemporary political issue of greatest national saliency at the time, it is easy to draw a link 
between Sánchez and the incumbent national government’s management of the separatist 
crisis. 
 
 
Figure 4: Average marginal effects (AME) of incumbency 
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Interestingly, evaluations of the incumbents produce heterogenous effects on the probability 
of voting for AA, the other main leftist party alongside PSOE. Those who positively 
evaluated Sánchez observed an increase in the probability of voting for either of the left-wing 
parties. The same was not observed by those who positively assessed Díaz, which actually 
significantly decreased voting for AA. This suggests that Sánchez was able to mobilise voters 
across the left both for his own party as well as for AA whilst Díaz could not.  
 
Finally, noteworthy amongst the control variables is that political distrust does not display an 
effect of significance in relation to support for Vox (see Table A2 and Table A4) whilst it 
does for a number of other parties, particularly AA. This is interesting because it, again, 
marks Vox as distinct from other European radical right parties, particularly right-wing 
populists, who have garnered support from voters who express a lack of trust in the political 
system (Mudde, 2004). Vox voters are not sourced from those who are politically 
disenchanted but those driven by the territorial conflict. 
 
Disloyalty on the right 
Since over two thirds of Vox’ votes came from voters that had previously voted for the other 
main right-wing parties, PP and Ciudadanos (Figure 1), I also run a logistic regression model 
estimating votes cast for Vox compared to the other right-wing parties amongst those who 
voted for right-wing parties in the 2016 general election. Table 3 reports the average marginal 
effects as percentage-points (detailed logistic regression output in appendix).  Of note is that 
concerns over immigration do not explain why right-wing voters moved their support to Vox. 
The results show that former PP and Ciudadanos voters are driven to Vox largely by their 
left-right ideological preferences as well as their support for reduced autonomous 
independence.  Right-wing voters who were in favour of reducing the competences of the 
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autonomous regions observed an increase in the probability of voting for Vox of eight 
percentage points. The explanatory role of nationalistic concerns related to devolution, 
therefore, exhibit both a significant and politically substantive effect on the individual-level 
vote choice for Vox and explains why right-leaning voters jumped ship from the mainstream 
right to the more extreme and nationalist option.  Given that the PP had been in power 
nationally until the summer of 2018, it may well be that the exodus of former PP voters with 
anti-devolution views is the result of the party’s own mismanagement of the territorial 
conflict during their term in office at the height of the Catalan crisis. 
 
Table 2: AME of support for Vox in 2018 amongst right-wing voters in 2016 
 Average Marginal Effect 
 (percentage point) 
Immigration (MIP) 2.9 
Reduce devolution 7.55*** 
Incumbency (Díaz) -0.41 
Incumbency (Sánchez) -1.1 
Left-right position 5.61*** 
Distrusts politics 2.73 
Participated in protest -4.30 
Gender 2.54 
Age 0.00 
Religion (ref: no attendance)  
Occasional churchgoer -6.60** 
Frequent churchgoer -0.34 
Education (ref: primary)  
Secondary education 7.30 
Tertiary education 7.75* 
Income 1.49 
Employment (ref: working)  
Unemployed 15.98** 
Retiree -5.53 
Student 8.72 
NILF 4.03 
N 487 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Conclusions 
The 2018 regional elections in Andalucía represent both a turning point in the regional 
government but also the regional party system (and likely nationally after the general election 
in April 2019) from the four-party system that emerged in 2015 (Orriols and Cordero, 2016) 
into a five-party system, with Vox joining on the extreme end of the rightist bloc previously 
dominated by the PP and more recently in tandem with Ciudadanos. 
 
Apart from the obvious ideological link between those who place themselves on the right of 
the ideological spectrum, the results of the analysis here report that voters are driven to vote 
for Vox when they believe in reducing the independence of the country’s autonomous 
regions. It is, therefore, clear that the political conflict engendered by the Catalan question 
that drives Vox’s pro-Spanish nationalism message is what attracts its supporters. 
Importantly, support for castrating devolved powers also explains the support for Vox 
amongst former voters of Ciudadanos and the PP who make up the largest source of Vox’ 
2018 vote revenue.  
 
Concerns over immigration do not have an independent effect on support for Vox. The 
significance of this finding is paramount as it marks Spain (still) as being different from the 
rest of Western Europe. Whilst Vox’s success represents the end of the country’s exceptional 
status as a country free from an electorally successful radical right-wing party, the 
motivations for this party’s success do not appear to be dependent on the individual-level 
determinants – mainly that of immigration – that explain support for right-wing populists 
elsewhere (Ford & Goodwin, 2014; Lubbers, Gijsberts and Scheepers, 2002; Norris, 2005; 
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Mudde, 2007; Zhirkov, 2014). The radical right may have dawned in Spain, but the 
influential political role of immigration on voting has not.   
                                                 
i
 The inability of the far right to gain electoral success in Spain has largely been attributed to 
the difficulty of far-right entrepreneurs to compete with the PP who have successfully catered 
to the preferences of far right-wing (Alonso and Kaltwasser, 2015); the low level of 
politicisation of core far-right policy issues such as immigration amongst political parties 
(Morales, Pardos-Prado and Ros, 2015); and the rigidity of the Spanish electoral system in 
accommodating to political newcomers (Alonso and Kaltwasser, 2015). 
ii
 Data provided by the post-electoral survey (study no:3236) conducted by the Centro de 
Investigaciónes Sociológicas (CIS) available at:  
http://www.cis.es/cis/opencm/ES/1_encuestas/index.jsp 
iii
 The Spanish Constitutional Court ruled that the referendum law brought forward by the 
Catalan Government was unconstitutional in response to a legal suit made by the national 
government (Boletin Oficial del Estado, 2017). 
iv
 That is until the arrival of Vox into the political arena. Arguably the arrival of a competitor 
to the right of the PP has already began to influence the party’s own position on immigration 
with their new leader, Pablo Casado, replicating some of Vox’s rhetoric critical of 
immigration. 
v
 On this point the party references the ban on parties that would seek independence for the 
German Länder in German Basic Law. 
vi
 Estimating the model using the PP as the baseline (Table A3) does not alter the main 
conclusions. 
vii
 Income categories (€): 1) No personal income, 2) <=300; 3) 301-600; 4) 601-900; 5) 901-
1200; 6) 1201-1800; 7) 1801-2400; 8) 2401-3000; 9) 3001-4500; 10) 4501-6000; 11)  
>6000. 
viii
 NILF: housewives, unpaid domestic workers, unemployed but not seeking work 
ix
 Additional sensitivity tests regarding the potential influence of urban provinces to confound 
the overall results confirms the consistency of the main findings (Figure A1 appendix), other 
robustness checks in appendix. 
 18 
 
Bibliography 
Alonso S, Cabeza L and Gomez B (2015) Parties’ electoral strategies in a two-dimensional 
political space: evidence from Spain and Great Britain. Party Politics 21(6): 851-865. 
 
Alsonso S and Kaltwasser CR (2015) Spain: No Country for the Populist Radical Right? 
South European Society and Politics 20(1): 21-45. 
 
Anduiza E, Cristancho C and Sabucedo JM (2014) Mobilization through online social 
networks: the political protest of the indignados in Spain. Information, Communication & 
Society 17(6): 750-764. 
 
Art D (2011). Inside the Radical Right. The Development of Anti-Immigrant Parties in 
Western Europe Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Boletín Oficial del Estado (2017) Sentencia 114/2017 de 17 de Octubre 2017. Sección del 
Tribunal Constitucional, 24th October, available at: 
https://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2017/10/24/pdfs/BOE-A-2017-12206.pdf 
 
Encarnación OG (2004) The Politics of Immigration: Why Spain is Different. Mediterranean 
Quarterly 15(4): 167-185. 
 
Ford R and Goodwin M (2014) Revolt on the Right: Explaining support for the radical right 
in Britain. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.  
 
Jabois M (2018) La nueva extrema derecha irrumpe en escena. El País, 4
th
 October, available 
at: https://elpais.com/politica/2018/10/03/actualidad/1538585644_517997.html 
 
Keeley G (2018). How Spain became the new centre of Europe’s migrant crisis. The Times, 
3
rd
 August, available at: https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/how-spain-became-the-new-
centre-of-europe-s-migrant-crisis-wfdsq9s65 
 
Kingsley P and Minder R (2017). Catalonia Separatism Revives Spanish Nationalism. The 
New York Times, 5
th
 October, available at: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/world/europe/catalan-independence-
referendum.html?smid=tw-share&ref=nyt-es&mcid=nyt-es&subid=article 
 
Kriesi H, et al. (2008) West European Politics in the Age of Globalisation. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Lambertucci C (2018) La extrema derecha de Vox llena Vistalegre con más de 9,000 
simpatizantes. El Pais, 8th October, available at: 
https://elpais.com/politica/2018/10/07/actualidad/1538918903_885191.html 
 
Llaneras K, Galán J and Andrino B (2018) Vox crece dónde hay más inmigrantes: un mapa 
de sus votos en cada municipio. El País, 3
rd
 December, available at: 
https://elpais.com/politica/2018/12/03/actualidad/1543829876_200181.html 
 
 19 
Lubbers M, Gijsberts M and Scheepers P (2002) Extreme right-wing voting in Western 
Europe. European Journal of Political Research 41(3): 345-378. 
 
Martín-Arroyo J (2018) Díaz convoca elecciones para evitar el desgaste del PSOE y la 
inestabilidad. El País, 9
th
 October, available at:  
https://elpais.com/politica/2018/10/08/actualidad/1538995646_481936.html 
 
Morales L, Pardos-Prado S and Ros V (2015) Issue emergence and the dynamics of electoral 
competition around immigration in Spain. Acta Politica 50(4): 461-485. 
 
Mudde C (2004) The Populist Zeitgeist. Government and Opposition 39(4): 541-563. 
 
Mudde C (2007) Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Oesch D (2013). The class basis of the cleavage between the New Left and the Radical Right: 
an analysis for Austria, Denmark, Norway and Switzerland. In: Rydgren J (ed.) Class Politics 
and the Radical Right. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, pp.31-51 
 
Orriols L (2018). Cataluña, un año después. El País, 4
th
 October, available at: 
https://elpais.com/elpais/2018/10/02/opinion/1538496914_838862.html 
 
Orriols L and Cordero G (2016) The Breakdown of the Spanish Two-Party System: The 
Upsurge of Podemos and Ciudadanos in the 2015 General Election. South European Society 
and Politics 21(4): 469-492. 
 
Norris P (2005) Radical Right. Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
 
Pardos-Prado S and Sagarzazu I (2019). Economic performance and center-periphery 
conflicts in party competition. Party Politics 25(1): 50-62.  
 
Rydgren J (2008). Immigration sceptics, xenophobes or racists? Radical right‐ wing voting in 
six West European countries. European Journal of Political Research 47(6): 737-765. 
 
Sánchez-Cuenca I and Dinas E (2012). Introduction: voters and parties in the Spanish 
political space. South European Society and Politics 17(3): 367-374. 
 
Sánchez-Cuenca I (2018) Vox y nacionalismo español. InfoLibre, 5
th
 December, available at: 
https://www.infolibre.es/noticias/opinion/columnas/2018/12/05/vox_nacionalismo_espanol_8
9529_1023.html 
 
Sanmartín OR (2018) Sánchez dice que es "exagerado" hablar de crisis migratoria y el PP le 
pide expulsar a más 'sin papeles', El Mundo, 18
th
 December, available at: 
https://www.elmundo.es/espana/2018/12/18/5c18c00ffc6c8363288b4577.html 
 
Simón P (2019) Vox en la brecha (de género), El País, 21
st
 January, available at: 
https://elpais.com/elpais/2019/01/20/opinion/1548007306_339168.html 
 
 20 
Turnbull-Dugarte SJ (2019) Selfies, Policies, or Votes? Political Party Use of Instagram in 
the 2015 and 2016 Spanish General Elections. Social Media + Society 5(2): 1-15. 
 
Viejo M and Alonso A (2018) La estrategia de Vox en redes sociales: ya es el primer partido 
en Instagram, la plataforma con más jóvenes. El País, 16
th
 December, available at: 
https://elpais.com/politica/2018/12/12/actualidad/1544624671_005462.html 
 
Vox (2018) 100 Medidas Para la España Viva.  
 
Zhirkov K (2014). Nativist but not alienated: A comparative perspective on the radical right 
vote in Western Europe. Party Politics 20(2): 286-296. 
  
 21 
Appendix 
 
Table A1: Summary Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Vote choice 2018 1413 3.271 1.913 1 6 
Immigration 1413 .103 .304 0 1 
Reduce autonomy 1413 .253 .435 0 1 
Incumbency (Díaz) 1413 3.8 2.911 0 10 
Incumbency (Sánchez) 1413 3.917 2.911 0 10 
Ideology 1413 4.643 1.881 1 10 
Distrust 1413 .577 .494 0 1 
Protest 1413 .502 .5 0 1 
Churchgoer 1413 .372 .649 0 2 
Education 1413 1.175 .768 0 2 
Income 1413 4.067 1.998 1 11 
Age 1413 47.994 17.128 18 92 
Gender 1413 .498 .5 0 1 
Employment 1413 1.391 1.048 0 4 
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Table A 2: Multinomial logistic regression models for 2018 election (baseline: abstention) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 PSOE PP Cs AA Vox 
      
Immigration (MIP) -0.18 0.23 0.07 0.11 0.40 
 (0.32) (0.34) (0.32) (0.39) (0.40) 
Reduce devolution -0.68*** 0.37 0.02 -0.52 1.16*** 
 (0.26) (0.25) (0.23) (0.35) (0.31) 
Incumbency (Díaz) 0.38*** -0.08 -0.08* -0.23*** -0.08 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) 
Incumbency (Sánchez) 0.19*** -0.16*** -0.14*** 0.23*** -0.33*** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09) 
Left-right position -0.29*** 0.88*** 0.35*** -0.82*** 0.97*** 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.13) 
Distrusts politics -0.10 -0.46** 0.10 -0.44** -0.02 
 (0.19) (0.23) (0.20) (0.22) (0.31) 
Participated in protest 0.89*** 0.56** 0.58*** 1.49*** 0.09 
 (0.21) (0.23) (0.21) (0.26) (0.30) 
Gender(male) 0.23 0.34 0.03 0.11 0.65* 
 (0.20) (0.26) (0.21) (0.23) (0.33) 
Age 0.04*** 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Religion: (base: no attendance)      
Occasional churchgoer 0.32 0.92*** 0.34 -0.30 0.18 
 (0.26) (0.30) (0.28) (0.37) (0.43) 
Frequent churchgoer -0.23 1.00*** 0.22 -0.08 0.70 
 (0.43) (0.36) (0.37) (0.56) (0.45) 
Education (base: primary)      
Secondary education -0.07 -0.04 0.21 0.28 0.56 
 (0.29) (0.36) (0.33) (0.37) (0.59) 
Tertiary education 0.51 0.32 0.72** 1.22*** 0.82 
 (0.33) (0.40) (0.35) (0.39) (0.61) 
Income -0.06 0.11 0.19** 0.05 0.23* 
 (0.08) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.13) 
Employment (base: working)      
Unemployed -0.54 -0.60 -0.26 -0.45 0.53 
 (0.35) (0.44) (0.37) (0.40) (0.55) 
Retiree -0.20 0.45 -0.07 -0.19 0.05 
 (0.36) (0.41) (0.39) (0.41) (0.57) 
Student 0.29 0.14 0.70 0.24 0.14 
 (0.49) (0.69) (0.51) (0.57) (0.97) 
NILF 0.00 1.06* 0.62 0.15 1.74** 
 (0.53) (0.62) (0.58) (0.66) (0.83) 
Constant -3.45*** -6.37*** -3.27*** 0.62 -8.00*** 
 (0.81) (0.86) (0.72) (0.88) (1.45) 
N   1,413   
Wald Chi2   762.31   
Robust standard errors (two-tailed) in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A 3: Multinomial logistic regression models for 2018 election (baseline: PP) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 PSOE Cs AA Vox Abstained 
      
Immigration (MIP) -0.41 -0.15 -0.12 0.17 -0.23 
 (0.41) (0.33) (0.46) (0.35) (0.34) 
Reduce devolution -1.04*** -0.35 -0.89** 0.79*** -0.37 
 (0.32) (0.24) (0.39) (0.29) (0.25) 
Incumbency (Díaz) 0.46*** 0.00 -0.14* 0.01 0.08 
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) 
Incumbency (Sánchez) 0.35*** 0.02 0.39*** -0.17* 0.16*** 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.06) 
Left-right position -1.17*** -0.53*** -1.70*** 0.09 -0.88*** 
 (0.11) (0.08) (0.13) (0.10) (0.10) 
Distrusts politics 0.36 0.55** 0.02 0.44 0.46** 
 (0.26) (0.22) (0.28) (0.28) (0.23) 
Participated in protest 0.33 0.03 0.94*** -0.47* -0.56** 
 (0.27) (0.22) (0.31) (0.28) (0.23) 
Gender(male) -0.11 -0.31 -0.22 0.31 -0.34 
 (0.28) (0.24) (0.31) (0.30) (0.26) 
Age 0.03** -0.01 -0.00 -0.03* -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Religion: (base: no attendance)      
Occasional churchgoer -0.60* -0.58** -1.23*** -0.74** -0.92*** 
 (0.31) (0.27) (0.40) (0.36) (0.30) 
Frequent churchgoer -1.23** -0.77** -1.08* -0.30 -1.00*** 
 (0.49) (0.35) (0.63) (0.37) (0.36) 
Education (base: primary)      
Secondary education -0.03 0.25 0.32 0.60 0.04 
 (0.41) (0.39) (0.47) (0.54) (0.36) 
Tertiary education 0.18 0.39 0.89* 0.50 -0.32 
 (0.44) (0.40) (0.49) (0.54) (0.40) 
Income -0.17 0.08 -0.06 0.12 -0.11 
 (0.11) (0.09) (0.12) (0.10) (0.11) 
Employment (base: working)      
Unemployed 0.06 0.34 0.15 1.13** 0.60 
 (0.49) (0.43) (0.54) (0.50) (0.44) 
Retiree -0.66 -0.52 -0.64 -0.41 -0.45 
 (0.47) (0.42) (0.49) (0.51) (0.41) 
Student 0.15 0.56 0.11 0.01 -0.14 
 (0.75) (0.65) (0.80) (0.95) (0.69) 
NILF -1.06 -0.44 -0.91 0.68 -1.06* 
 (0.65) (0.57) (0.78) (0.65) (0.62) 
Constant 2.92*** 3.10*** 6.99*** -1.63 6.37*** 
 (1.01) (0.78) (1.08) (1.29) (0.86) 
      
Observations 1,413 1,413 1,413 1,413 1,413 
Robust standard errors (two-tailed) in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A 4: Average marginal effect of multinomial estimation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 PSOE PP Cs AA Vox 
      
Immigration (MIP) -0.03 0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Reduce devolution -0.06** 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.05*** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Incumbency (Díaz) 0.05*** -0.01 -0.01** -0.03*** -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Incumbency (Sánchez) 0.02*** -0.00 -0.01*** 0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Left-right position -0.02*** 0.05*** 0.01*** -0.06*** 0.02*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Distrusts politics 0.01 -0.04** 0.03* -0.03** 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Participated in protest 0.04** 0.02 0.01 0.08*** -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Gender(male) 0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.00 0.02* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Age 0.00*** 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Religion: (base: no attendance)      
Occasional churchgoer 0.03 0.07*** 0.00 -0.04* -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Frequent churchgoer -0.03 0.07** -0.01 -0.01 0.01 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) 
Education (base: primary)      
Secondary education -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Tertiary education 0.00 -0.02 0.03 0.07*** 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Income -0.01 -0.00 0.01** 0.00 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Employment (base: working)      
Unemployed -0.04 -0.05* -0.01 -0.01 0.05* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Retiree -0.02 0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Student 0.01 -0.02 0.07 -0.00 -0.01 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) 
NILF -0.03 0.03 0.00 -0.00 0.06 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
      
Observations 1,413 1,413 1,413 1,413 1,413 
Robust standard errors (two-tailed) in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A 5: Logistic regression estimating vote for Vox amongst right-wing party voters 
in 2016 general election 
 Voted Vox 
  
Immigration (MIP) 0.28 
 (0.37) 
Reduce devolution 0.77** 
 (0.32) 
Incumbency (Díaz) -0.04 
 (0.08) 
Incumbency (Sánchez) -0.11 
 (0.11) 
Left-right position 0.57*** 
 (0.12) 
Distrusts politics 0.28 
 (0.31) 
Participated in protest -0.44 
 (0.30) 
Religion: (base: no attendance)  
Occasional churchgoer -0.74* 
 (0.39) 
Frequent churchgoer -0.03 
 (0.43) 
Education (base: primary)  
Secondary education 0.91 
 (0.67) 
Tertiary education 0.95 
 (0.66) 
Income 0.15 
 (0.11) 
Age -0.00 
 (0.01) 
Gender (male) 0.26 
 (0.32) 
Employment (base: working)  
Unemployed 1.23** 
 (0.53) 
Retiree -0.71 
 (0.54) 
Student 0.75 
 (0.99) 
NILF 0.38 
 (0.77) 
Constant -7.57*** 
 (1.56) 
Observations 487 
Robust standard errors (two-tailed) in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 26 
Table A 6: Logistic regression estimating vote for Vox amongst all party voters in 2016 
general election with devolution and former vote-choice interaction 
 Vote Vox 
Immigration (MIP) 0.40 
 (0.34) 
Reduce devolution 2.70** 
 (1.14) 
PSOE voter -0.34 
 (1.51) 
PP voter 1.18 
 (1.11) 
Cs voter 1.43 
 (1.14) 
UP voter -0.48 
 (0.91) 
Devolution*PSOE 0.60 
 (1.63) 
Devolution*PP -1.99 
 (1.21) 
Devolution*CS -2.04 
 (1.25) 
Devolution*UP 0.00 
 (0.00) 
Incumbency (Díaz) -0.00 
 (0.07) 
Incumbency (Sánchez) -0.27*** 
 (0.10) 
Left-right position  0.49*** 
 (0.10) 
Political distrust 0.02 
 (0.30) 
Participated in protest -0.39 
 (0.27) 
Religion (base: no attendance)  
Occasional churchgoer -0.43 
 (0.39) 
Frequent churchgoer -0.02 
 (0.42) 
Education (base: primary)  
Secondary education 0.71 
 (0.59) 
Tertiary education 0.76 
 (0.57) 
Income 0.11 
 (0.10) 
Age -0.02 
 (0.01) 
 27 
Gender (male) 0.32 
 (0.29) 
Employment (base: working)  
Unemployed 0.67 
 (0.48) 
Retiree -0.39 
 (0.52) 
Student -0.24 
 (0.90) 
NILF 0.68 
 (0.70) 
Constant -6.82*** 
 (1.62) 
  
Observations 1,220 
Robust standard errors (two-tailed) in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure A5: Robustness Check (Vox vote choice) 
 
 
 
